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Nazi Owned Corporations Control French Economy

September 17, 2015

HotelGermanOccupation.jpg
(left, Nazis march down Champs de Elyse)

How Germany Rose From Nazi Ashes-2

The Role of Argentina and France

Martin Bormann: Nazi in Exile (1981) by Paul Manning - Below are excerpts from a summary by Dave Emory, who deserves credit for keeping this story alive. 

Long after the war, the Bor­mann orga­ni­za­tion con­tin­ued to wield effec­tive con­trol of the French econ­omy, uti­liz­ing the cor­po­rate rela­tion­ships devel­oped before and dur­ing the occupation. This control is exercised by a shadowy network of personal contacts, the Illuminati, which includes both Nazis and their erstwhile "enemies." 





by Paul Manning
(henrymakow.com) 

Among the many countries that figured in an important way in the Bormann structure were Argentina and France.

When Bor­mann gave the go-ahead in his over­all flight cap­i­tal pro­gram after the deci­sions at Stras­bourg, [in August 1944] over $6 bil­lion of this money flowed into Buenos Aires for invest­ment there and else­where in Latin Amer­ica. The invest­ments cov­ered fac­to­ries, hotels, resorts, cat­tle, banks, land, sugar and cof­fee plan­ta­tions, met­al­lurgy, insur­ance, elec­tri­cal prod­ucts, con­struc­tion, and com­mu­ni­ca­tions. It is much the same invest­ment spec­trum as estab­lished in Spain. West Ger­man [i.e. Nazi] invest­ments today account for nearly 45 per­cent of all for­eign invest­ments in Spain.

French finan­cial insti­tu­tions were cen­tral to the Bor­mann plan. Before D-day four Paris banks, Worms et Cie., Banque de Paris et de Pays-Bas, Banque de l'Indochine (now with 'et de Suez' added to its name), and Banque Nationale pour le Com­merce et l'Industrie (now Banque Nationale de Paris), were used by Bor­mann to siphon NSDAP and other Ger­man money in France to their bank branches in the colonies, where it was safe­guarded and invested for its Ger­man ownership. (Ibid.; p. 140.)

In the years before the war, the Ger­man busi­ness­men, indus­tri­al­ists, and bankers had estab­lished close ties with their coun­ter­parts in France. After the blitzkrieg and inva­sion, the same French­men in many cases went on work­ing with their Ger­man peers. They didn't have much choice, to be sure, and the occu­pa­tion being insti­tuted, very few in the high ech­e­lons of com­merce and finance failed to col­lab­o­rate. The Third Republic's busi­ness elite was vir­tu­ally unchanged after 1940 . . . 

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They regarded the war and Hitler as an unfor­tu­nate diver­sion from their chief mis­sion of pre­vent­ing a com­mu­nist rev­o­lu­tion in France. Anti­bol­she­vism was a com­mon denom­i­na­tor link­ing these French­men to Ger­mans, and it accounted for a vol­un­teer French divi­sion on the East­ern Front. . .The upper-class men who had been superbly trained in finance and admin­is­tra­tion at one of the two grand corps schools were referred to as France's per­ma­nent 'wall of money,' and as pro­fes­sion­als they came into their own in 1940. They agreed to the estab­lish­ment of Ger­man sub­sidiary firms in France and per­mit­ted a gen­eral buy-in to French companies.

The Ger­man eco­nomic con­trol of the French econ­omy pro­ceeded smoothly into the post­war period. Long after the war, the Bor­mann orga­ni­za­tion con­tin­ued to wield effec­tive con­trol of the French econ­omy, uti­liz­ing the cor­po­rate rela­tion­ships devel­oped before and dur­ing the occupation.

The char­ac­ter­is­tic secrecy sur­round­ing the actions of Ger­man indus­tri­al­ists and bankers dur­ing the final nine months of the war, when Bormann's flight cap­i­tal pro­gram held their com­plete atten­tion, was also car­ried over into the post­war years, when they began pulling back the skeins of eco­nomic wealth and power that stretched out to neu­tral nations of the world and to for­merly occu­pied lands. 

There was a sug­ges­tion of this in France. Flora Lewis, writ­ing from Paris in the New York Times of August 28, 1972, told of her con­ver­sa­tion with a French pub­lisher: 'It would not be pos­si­ble to trace own­er­ship of cor­po­ra­tions and the power struc­ture as in the United States. 'They' would not per­mit it. 'They' would find a way to hound and tor­ture any­one who tried,' commented the pub­lisher. 'They' seem to be a fairly small group of peo­ple who know each other, but many are not at all known to the pub­lic. 'They' move in and out of gov­ern­ment jobs, but pub­lic ser­vice appar­ently serves to win pri­vate pro­mo­tion rather than the other way around. 

The Gov­ern­ment 'con­trol' that prac­ti­cally every­one men­tions can­not be traced through stock hold­ings, reg­u­la­tory agen­cies, pub­lic deci­sions. It seems to func­tion through a maze of per­sonal con­tacts and tacit under­stand­ings.' The under­stand­ings arrived at in the power struc­ture of France reach back to pre­war days, were con­tin­ued dur­ing the occu­pa­tion, and have car­ried over to the present time. 

Lewis, in her report from Paris, com­mented fur­ther: 'This hid­den con­trol of gov­ern­ment and cor­po­ra­tions has pro­duced a gen­eral unease in Paris.' Along with the unease, the fact that France has lin­ger­ing and seri­ous social and polit­i­cal ail­ments is a residue of World War II and of an eco­nomic occu­pa­tion that was never really ter­mi­nated with the with­drawal of Ger­man troops beyond the Rhine. It was this spe­cial eco­nomic rela­tion­ship between Ger­man and French indus­tri­al­ists that made it pos­si­ble for Friedrich Flick to arrange with the De-Wendel steel firm in France for pur­chase of his shares in his Ruhr coal com­bine for $45 mil­lion, which was to start him once more on the road back to wealth and power, after years in prison fol­low­ing his con­vic­tion at Nurem­berg. 

West Germany's eco­nomic power struc­ture is fueled by a two-tier sys­tem: the cor­po­ra­tions and indi­vid­u­als who pub­licly rep­re­sent the prod­ucts that are com­mon house­hold names around the world, and the secre­tive groups oper­at­ing in the back­ground as hold­ing com­pa­nies and who pull the threads of power in over­seas cor­po­ra­tions estab­lished dur­ing the Bor­mann tenure in the Third Reich. 

As explained to me, 'These threads are like the strands of a spider's web and no one knows where they lead -- except the inner cir­cle of the Bor­mann orga­ni­za­tion in South America.
--
How Germany Rose from Nazi Ashes - Part One 




Scruples - the game of moral dillemas

Henry Makow received his Ph.D. in English Literature from the University of Toronto in 1982. He welcomes your comments at

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